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When a ﬁrm decides which products to offer or put on display, it takes into ac-
counttheproducts’abilitytoattractattentiontothebrandnameasawhole. Thus,
the value of a product to the ﬁrm emanates from the consumer demand it directly
meets, as well as the indirect demand it generates for the ﬁrms’ other products.
Weexplorethisideainthecontextofastylizedmodelofcompetitionbetweenme-
dia content providers (broadcast TV channels, internet portals, newspapers) over
consumers with limited attention. We characterize the equilibrium use of prod-
ucts as attention grabbers and its implications for consumer conversion, industry
proﬁts, and (mostly vertical) product differentiation.
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1. Introduction
Consumers in the modern marketplace need to sort through an overwhelming number
of available options, and hence, may not be able to pay serious attention to each and
every feasible alternative. Consequently, some options may receive more attention than
others. This may be due to the fact that some options are better than others along some
salient dimension. For example, when searching for a laptop computer, a very low price
or a very light weight will most likely draw one’s attention; when ﬂipping through TV
channels in search of a program to view, one may pay greater attention to a sensational
news report or to a special guest appearance by a celebrity on a sitcom. Alternatively,
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Thus, the mere offering of a particular item can have an indirect effect on a ﬁrm’s
market share by drawing attention to the ﬁrm and other items it offers. For instance,
the items that stores display on their shop front and web retailers put on their home
pages can exert a positive externality on other items by persuading consumers to enter
the store/website and browse its selection. Similarly, the shows and news items that a
TV network chooses to broadcast may persuade viewers to stay tuned to that channel
and, therefore, become exposed to other programs. As a result, consumers whose atten-
tion is initially attracted to a ﬁrm because of a particular item may end up consuming
another item that it offers. Firms may take this indirect marketing effect into account
when designing a product line. Speciﬁcally, they may introduce an item even when the
direct demand for this item fails to cover its cost.
We explore this motive by proposing a stylized model of market competition over
consumers with limited attention. In our model, ﬁrms offer menus of “items” in re-
sponse to consumer preferences over such menus. Consumers’ limited attention gives
ﬁrms an incentive to expand their menu and include “pure attention grabbers,” namely,
items that do not add to the consumer’s utility from the menu, and whose sole function
is, therefore, to attract consumers’ attention to other items the ﬁrm offers. We analyze
the ﬁrms’ trade-off between the cost of adding pure attention grabbers and the beneﬁt
of the extra market share they may generate.
The following examples illustrate a variety of contexts in which certain items may be
offeredeveniftheyarerarelyconsumed,becausetheyattractconsumerstotheﬁrmand
persuade them to consider other items that are offered.
Example 1.1. Think of a consumer who wants to buy a new laptop computer. He ini-
tially considers a particular model x, possibly because it is his current machine. The
consumer may then notice that a computer store offers a model y that is signiﬁcantly
lighter than x. This gives the consumer a sufﬁcient reason to consider y in addition to
x. Upon closer inspection, the consumer realizes that he does not like y as much as he
does x. However, since he is already inside the store, he may browse the other laptop
computers on offer and ﬁnd a model z that he ranks above both x and y. Thus, although
few consumers may actually buy y, this model functions as a “door opener” that attracts
consumers’ serious attention to the other products offered by the store.1 ♦
Example 1.2. Consider the recent strategy of fast-food chains (notably McDonald’s in
2004) of enriching their menus with “healthy” options such as salads and fresh fruit in
an attempt to appeal to health-conscious customers. One may argue (see Warner 2006
for a journalistic account) that the motive behind this marketing move is not so much
to generate large direct revenues from the healthy options, but to create a more health-
conscious image that will induce a segment of the consumer population to consider
1One recent example is the launch of Apple’s Macbook Air, the thinnest available laptop, measuring 0.76
inches at its thickest point and tapering to just 0.16 inches. These extreme features will most likely attract
the attention of consumers contemplating a switch from Windows-based laptops. However, such con-
sumers may decide not to switch upon learning that the Macbook Air requires an external DVD drive or
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McDonald’s restaurants. Once at the restaurant, these consumers will not necessarily
choose the healthiest items in the menu, and their consumption decision at the restau-
rant will involve other motives (such as price or how ﬁlling the meal is). ♦
Example1.3. Theuseofattention-grabbingitemsisoftenassociatedwithcompetition
among media platforms, such as broadcast television, newspapers, or internet portals.
Consider the case of broadcast TV. Viewers have a tendency to adopt a default chan-
nel that serves as a “home base.” For the competing channel, the challenge is ﬁrst to
draw the viewer’s attention and then to convince him to stay with it. The channel’s pro-
gramming strategy takes this motive into account. For instance, the channel may wish
to introduce sensational shows or sensational news ﬂashes because of their attention-
grabbing value.2 Alternatively, it may wish to air programs that are identical or similar
to the viewer’s favorite shows on his default channel, so that he can recognize familiar
genres while on a channel-ﬂipping cruise. ♦
We propose a theoretical framework that incorporates the strategic use of attention
grabbers into models of market competition. In this paper, we take only a ﬁrst step in
this direction, by analyzing a model that focuses exclusively on the above-mentioned
trade-off between the cost of offering pure attention grabbers and the indirect gain in
marketsharethattheymaygenerate. Inthemodel,twoﬁrms, interpretedasmediaplat-
forms as in Example 1.3, face a continuum of identical consumers having well deﬁned
preferences over menus. The ﬁrms simultaneously choose a menu of “items” (in the TV
example, an item is a program). It is costly for a ﬁrm to add items to its menu. Each ﬁrm
aims to maximize (the value of) its market share minus the ﬁxed costs associated with
its menu.
Each consumer is initially assigned to one ﬁrm i (each ﬁrm initially gets half the
consumers),whichisinterpretedashisdefaultmediaprovider. Theconsumer’sdecision
whether to switch to the competing ﬁrm j follows a two-stage procedure. In the ﬁrst
stage,itisdeterminedwhethertheconsumerwillpayattentionto j’smenu. Conditional
on the consumer’s attention being drawn to j’s menu, the consumer will switch if and
only if he ﬁnds j’s menu strictly superior to i’s menu, according to his preferences over
menus. Thus, the consumer’s choice procedure is biased in favor of his home base: he
switches to another ﬁrm only if his attention is drawn to its menu and he strictly prefers
it to his default menu.
We assume that no two menus are perfect substitutes: the consumer is never indif-
ferent between any two menus that do not contain one another. If consumers are indif-
ferentbetweenamenu M andalargermenu M  ⊃ M, wesaythattheitemsin M \M are
pure attention grabbers. Our interpretation of this indifference is that when consumers
are endowed with the menu M , they do not consume the items in M  \ M on a regular
basis. We referto the smallestsubset of M that does not contain pure attention grabbers
2ArecentstudybytheProjectofExcellenceinJournalism(Rosenstieletal. 2007)arguesthat“Inreporting
their priorities, TV producers and journalists said things like, ‘People are always drawn to yellow tape and
ﬂashing lights’ or ‘urgent stories are the attention grabbers.’ Others repeated the familiar mantra, ‘if it
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as the set of “content items” in M. Our no-perfect-substitutes assumption guarantees
that this subset, denoted L(M), is unique.
The novel element of the model is the attention-generation process in the ﬁrst stage
of the consumers’ choice procedure. Here we extend a modeling approach presented in
Eliaz and Spiegler (forthcoming). The consumer is endowed with a primitive called an
attention function f, which determines whether the consumer will pay attention to the
new menu Mj given the set of content items in the default menu L(Mi). Thus, whether
the consumer’s attention will be drawn to the new media provider depends on the sub-
set of regularly consumed items in the default menu as well as the entire menu offered
by the new provider. We view the attention function as an unobservable personal char-
acteristic of the consumer that can be elicited (at least partially) from observed choices.
The attention function captures the ease of attracting the consumer’s attention under
various circumstances. The case of a rational consumer is subsumed into the model as
a special case, in which the consumer always considers all available menus and thus
always chooses according to his preferences over menus.
We wish to emphasize that our main objective in this paper is to propose a theo-
retical approach for incorporating competition over consumers’ attention into input–
output models. We interpret the model in media-market terms for expositional pur-
poses, as it adds to theconcreteness of thepresentation. The model itself is very stylized
and should not be mistaken for a descriptively faithful account of real-life media indus-
tries. We hope to demonstrate the kinds of questions and answers one can obtain with
thismodelingapproach,whichwebelievecanserveasaplatformformoredescriptively
faithful applications to media markets and other industries. The following key elements
of the market model do seem to ﬁt the media scenario.
(i) The ﬁrms’ objective function. For media platforms such as commercial broad-
casting networks, newspapers, content websites, or search engines, prices do not
play a strategic role. Because their proﬁt is mostly generated by advertisements,
it is directly related to the amount of trafﬁc they attract.
(ii) Each consumer has a “default” provider. Consumers of newspapers, broadcast
television, and online content tend to exhibit some degree of loyalty to a particu-
lar newspaper, TV network, or internet portal. For example, in a study based on
minute-by-minute television viewing for 1,067 individuals (Meyer and Muthaly
2008), the authors conclude that “people who watch a lot of television are less
likely to switch frequently between channels.” As to internet browsing, Bucklin
and Sismeiro (2003) and Zauberman (2003) present evidence that users develop
“within-site lock-in.”
(iii) The scarcity of consumer attention and the role of content in allocating it.T h e
need to attract a viewer/reader’s attention is best captured by the editorial
choices of headlines and news ﬂashes, as well as the level of sensationalism (e.g.,
the degree of violence or obscenity) of television programs (e.g., the escalating
level of extremity adopted by reality shows such as “Fear Factor” or talk shows
suchas“JerrySpringer”). Ofcourse, thesecontentstrategiesarepartlyaresponseTheoretical Economics 6 (2011) Strategic use of attention grabbers 131
to changing viewers’ tastes, but we believe it may be insightful to think of them
also as a response to changes in viewers’ attention span.3
The consumer’s choice procedure determines the market share that each ﬁrm re-
ceives under any proﬁle of menus they offer. This completes the speciﬁcation of a sym-
metric,complete-information,simultaneous-movegameplayedbetweenthetwoﬁrms.
Ourassumptionsontheﬁrms’coststructureimplythatifconsumerswererational,then
in Nash equilibrium, both ﬁrms would offer the smallest menu that maximizes con-
sumers’ utility and, hence, contains no pure attention grabbers. We show that under a
few mild assumptions on the model’s primitives, symmetric Nash equilibrium departs
from this rational-consumer benchmark: the probability that ﬁrms offer menus that
maximize consumer utility is strictly between 0 and 1. Moreover, ﬁrms employ pure
attention grabbers with positive probability.
The analytic heart of the paper focuses on two classes of attention functions. It is
for these classes that we provide a characterization of symmetric Nash equilibria. We
begin in Section 3 with the case in which items can be ordered according to their de-
gree of salience or according to how well they attract attention. For a menu to attract
a consumer’s attention, it must contain an item that is at least as “sensational” as all
content items in the consumer’s default menu. We show that in this case of “salience-
based” attention, symmetric Nash equilibria have several strong properties. First, while
the equilibrium outcome departs from the rational-consumer benchmark, ﬁrms earn
the same proﬁts as if consumers had unlimited attention. Second, the only menus that
contain pure attention grabbers in equilibrium are those that maximize consumer util-
ity. Third, the probability that ﬁrms offer such utility-maximizing menus is a decreasing
function of the cost of the item with the highest “sensation value.” Finally, this item is
employed with positive probability as a pure attention grabber.
In Section 4 we turn to another class of attention functions, which we refer to as
similarity-based. Here, we impose additional structure: we assume for simplicity that
every menu has only one content item (e.g., the favorite show on a TV channel) and
that items can be ordered along the real line, such that similarity means proximity. The
consumer considers a new media provider if and only if it offers an item that is similar
to the content item on the consumer’s default menu.4 We show that as in the case of
salience-based attention, ﬁrms’ proﬁts in symmetric Nash equilibrium are the same as
in the rational-consumer benchmark. In the extreme case in which one item resembles
3One arena where sensationalism is intensely used for attention-grabbing purposes is local television
news. According to the Boston Globe (Bennett 2007), “The past two decades have seen a marked shift in
local television news across the country, away from in-depth coverage and towards speed and spectacle.”
4Kennedy (2002) analyzes program introductions by television networks, and compares the payoff to
imitative and differentiated introductions. His analysis indicates that the networks imitate one another
when introducing new programs and that, on average, imitative introductions underperform in terms of
rating relative to differentiated introductions. The author concludes that this ﬁnding “suggests that non-
payoff-maximizing imitation is common in at least one industry.” We propose to interpret the author’s
ﬁnding as evidence suggesting that a television program that imitates a program aired by another network
serves as an attention grabber and, therefore, its overall value to the network is not generated purely by its
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another if and only if the two are identical, we provide a complete characterization of
symmetricequilibria,includingtheprobabilitythateachitemisofferedasarealcontent
item and as a pure attention grabber, and the rate at which consumers switch suppliers
in equilibrium.
In both cases of salience-based and similarity-based attention, we see that indus-
try proﬁts are as if attention was not scarce. Although low-cost, low-quality menus are
offered in equilibrium, the equilibrium cost of pure attention grabbers turns out to dis-
sipate whatever excess proﬁts such menus might enable. In Section 5, we show that
whenever ﬁrms earn rational-consumer equilibrium proﬁts, the equilibrium has an im-
portant property that relates two aspects of a ﬁrm’s strategy: the quality of its menu and
whether it contains pure attention grabbers. Speciﬁcally, for every pair of menus M and
M  that are offered in equilibrium, if M is not the best menu and if consumer attention
is drawn from M to M  only as a result of pure attention grabbers in M ,t h e ni tm u s t
be the case that the consumer prefers M  to M. This result, referred to as the effective
marketing property, extends a similar ﬁnding in Eliaz and Spiegler (forthcoming).
Our assumption that all consumers are identical is clearly unrealistic, and its role
in the present paper is to sharpen our understanding of the role of attention grabbing
in a competitive environment. In Section 6 we introduce preference heterogeneity into
a model with salience-based attention. We assume that for every consumer type, each
menu has a single content item. We also assume that the best attention grabber is not
the favorite item for any consumer type. We show that if menu costs are sufﬁciently
small, there is a symmetric Nash equilibrium that mimics a particular speciﬁcation
of the homogenous-consumers case analyzed in Section 3. Thus, many of the prop-
erties derived for the homogenous-consumers case carry over to the heterogeneous-
consumers case.
Related literature
This paper extends Eliaz and Spiegler (forthcoming), where we originally introduced
the idea of a two-stage choice procedure in which consumers ﬁrst form a “consider-
ation set,” which is a subset of the objectively feasible set of market alternatives, and
then apply preferences to the consideration set.5 In both papers, only the ﬁrst stage of
the choice procedure is sensitive to the ﬁrms’ marketing strategies. Both papers study
market models in which ﬁrms choose which product to offer and how to market it, aim-
ing to maximize the value of their market share minus the ﬁxed costs associated with
their strategies. Finally, the two papers have a few themes in common: the question of
whethercompetitivemarketingbringsindustryproﬁtstotherational-consumerbench-
mark level, and the question of how the ﬁrms’ product design and marketing strategies
are correlated, as captured by the effective marketing property.
However, there are several substantial differences between the two papers. First
and foremost, the formalism used here is quite different than the one used in Eliaz
5The notion of consideration sets originates from the marketing literature, which has long recognized
that the consumption decision follows a two-step decision process. For extensive surveys of this literature,
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and Spiegler (forthcoming). In particular, there are important contrasts in how each
paper models ﬁrms’ strategies and the consumers’ choice process. While in Eliaz and
Spiegler (forthcoming) there is an a priori distinction between product design and mar-
keting strategies, in the present paper, the marketing strategies in question—pure at-
tention grabbers—are themselves products. Thus, two consumers with different pref-
erences would have a different partition of a given menu into content items and pure
attention grabbers. This not only adds a technical complication to the model, but also
changes the analysis when the consumer population is heterogeneous (an extension
EliazandSpiegler(forthcoming)donotaddress). Second,thereistheobviousdifference
in the marketing strategies under examination: the use of attention-grabbing products
by multiproduct ﬁrms in the present paper, as opposed to the use of advertising and
product display by single-product ﬁrms in Eliaz and Spiegler (forthcoming). Finally, the
classes of attention functions analyzed in the two papers are different and lead to very
different analysis.
Piccione and Spiegler (2010) study the two-stage procedure in a market model that
incorporates price setting while abstracting from ﬁxed costs. In that model, single-
productﬁrmschoosethepriceoftheirproductaswellasits“priceformat.” Whetherthe
consumer makes a price comparison between the two ﬁrms is purely a function of the
ﬁrms’ price formats, which captures the complexity of comparing them. The Piccione–
Spiegler speciﬁcation of the two-stage procedure and the ﬁrms’ objective function leads
to a market model that differs substantially from this paper.
A choice-theoretic analysis of decision processes that involve consideration set for-
mation is explored in Masatlioglu and Nakajima (2009) and in Masatlioglu et al. (2009).
The ﬁrst paper axiomatizes a more general choice procedure than ours, in which the
consumer iteratively constructs consideration sets starting from some exogenously
given default option. The second paper axiomatizes a two-stage choice procedure in
which ﬁrst, the decision-maker employs an “attention ﬁlter” to shrink the objectively
feasible set to a consideration set, and second, he applies his preferences to the consid-
eration set. Both papers are concerned with eliciting the parameters of the choice pro-
cedures (e.g., the preference orderings and the attention ﬁlter) from observed behavior.
As such, these papers complement our own, which deals with strategic manipulation of
consumers’ consideration sets.
Anotherrelatedstrandinthedecision-theoreticliteratureconcernspreferencesover
menus (e.g., Kreps 1979, Dekel et al. 2001, Gul and Pesendorfer 2001). Indeed, in the
concluding section we show that a special case of our model with salience-based atten-
tion can be reinterpreted as an instance of a “naive” multi-selves model, a reinterpreta-
tion with interesting welfare implications.
The pure attention grabbers in our paper constitute a particular form of “loss lead-
ers”: since they are not regularly consumed, they superﬁcially fail to cover their cost. By
comparison, the notion of loss leaders in the literature typically refers to products that
are consumed on a regular basis yet generate a direct loss because they are priced below
marginal cost (e.g., see Lal and Matutes 1994).6
6One notable exception is Kamenica (2008), which illustrates a signalling equilibrium in which there is
positive probability that a monopolist produces a high quality product even in a state of nature where all134 Eliaz and Spiegler Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
The indirect effect that a television show can have on viewers is documented in
Anand and Shachar (2004). That paper provides empirical evidence that the introduc-
tion of a new television show to a network increases the extent to which viewers watch
other shows on that network. The authors, however, do not interpret their ﬁnding as ev-
idence of the use of attention grabbers. Instead, they offer an explanation based on the
idea that a consumer who observes some product of a ﬁrm infers information about the
entire product line of that ﬁrm.
Finally, this paper joins the theoretical literature on market interactions between
proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms and boundedly rational consumers. Ellison (2006), Armstrong
(2008),a n dSpiegler (forthcoming) provide general treatments of this growing research
ﬁeld.
2. A model
We analyze an idealized model of competition between media platforms. Let X be a
ﬁnite set of “items,” where |X|≥2. A menu is a nonempty subset of X.L e tP(X)be the
set of all menus. Two ﬁrms play a symmetric complete-information game in which they
simultaneously choose menus. A mixed strategy for a ﬁrm is a probability distribution
σ ∈  (P(X)). We denote the support of σ by S(σ). Each menu carries a ﬁxed cost,
deﬁned as c(M) =
 
x∈M cx,w h e r ecx > 0 is the ﬁxed cost associated with the item x.
Each ﬁrm aims to maximize the value of its market share minus its costs. Henceforth,
we normalize the costs to be expressed in terms of market share.
The two ﬁrms face a continuum of identical consumers, who are characterized by
twoprimitives: apreferencerelation overthesetofmenusP(X)andanattentionfunc-
tion f :X × P(X)→{ 0 1} that governs the attention-grabbing process. The preference
relation   satisﬁes two properties.
Monotonicity: For every M M  ∈ P(X),i fM ⊂ M ,t h e nM    M.
No perfect substitutes: For every M M  ∈ P(X),i fM ∼ M ,t h e nM ⊆ M  or M  ⊆ M.
We interpret monotonicity as a free disposal property: the consumer is free to watch
any subset of a given menu of programs. The no-perfect-substitutes assumption says
that the consumer is never indifferent between menus that do not contain one another.
It has the following immediate implication, which will play an important role in the se-
quel: for every menu M,t h e r ei saunique subset L(M) ⊆ M that satisﬁes the property,
if M  ⊆ M and M  ∼ M,t h e nM  ⊇ L(M). We interpret L(M) as the set of items the con-
sumer actually consumes regularly from the menu M.T h ei t e m si nL(M) are referred to
as content items in M, while the items in M \ L(M) are referred to as the pure attention
grabbers in M. Thus, an item functions as a pure attention grabber in a menu if its in-
clusion is not necessary to satisfy consumer tastes; L(M) is the unique smallest subset
of M that does not contain pure attention grabbers.
Definition1 (Beatingrelation). Wesaythat M beatsM  ifthefollowingtwoconditions
hold: (i) there exists x ∈ M such that f(x L(M )) = 1; (ii) M   M .
consumer types strictly prefer other products in the ﬁrm’s product line. Kamenica refers to such a product
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Armed with this deﬁnition, we are ﬁnally ready to describe consumer choice. Given
ap r o ﬁ l eo fm e n u s(M1 M2), consumers choose according to the following two-stage
procedure. Each consumer is initially assigned (with equal probability) to a random
ﬁrm i = 1 2. This initial assignment represents the consumer’s default. The consumer
switches to ﬁrm j  = i if and only if Mj beats Mi.
The interpretation is as follows. The consumer has a tendency to stick to his default
media provider, and not even consider alternative providers, due to lack of attention or
sheer inertia. The consumer considers a new ﬁrm only if its menu includes an item that
satisﬁesacertaincriterion(capturedbyf)inrelationtotheitemsheregularly consumes
from the default provider. The existence of such an item draws the consumer’s attention
tothenewﬁrm. Havingconsidereditsmenu,theconsumerswitchestoitonlyifheﬁnds
it strictly superior (accordingto his true underlying preferences  ) to his defaultmenu.7
Thebeatingrelationisnothingbutthestrictrevealed preferencerelationovermenus
induced by the consumer’s choice procedure. To an outside observer, Mj is revealed
to be preferred to Mi if a consumer for whom Mi is the default menu switches to Mj.
According to our model, this revealed preference relation typically fails to coincide with
the consumer’s true preference relation  , because it also reﬂects his limited attention.
And as we see below, the beating relation may be intransitive.
The following example illustrates how consumer choice may be sensitive to pure
attention grabbers.
Example1. LetX ={ a b},andassume{a b}∼{ a} { b}, f(b {b}) = 1,andf(a {b}) = 0.
Then if a consumer is initially assigned to a ﬁrm that offers the menu {b} and the rival
ﬁrm offers the menu {a}, the consumer will stick to his default ﬁrm. However, if the rival
ﬁrm offers {a b}, the consumer will switch to the new ﬁrm. ♦
Thetuple  X c   f  fullydeﬁnesthesimultaneous-movegameplayedbetweenthe






2[1+maxx∈Mi f(x L(Mj))]−c(Mi) if Mi   Mj
1
2[1−maxx∈Mj f(x L(Mi))]−c(Mi) if Mj   Mi
1
2 −c(Mi) if Mi ∼ Mj.
We impose the following assumptions on the primitives  , c,a n df.
A1. For every M M  ∈ P(X),i fM   M ,t h e nc(L(M))>c(L(M )).
A2. For every M ∈ P(X),t h e r ee x i s t sx ∈ X such that f(x M)= 1.
A3. The function c(X)< 1
2.
Assumption A1 links the costs of providing a menu with consumer preferences.
When neither M nor M  contains pure attention grabbers, if consumers prefer M to M ,
7Note that although the second argument of f can be any M ∈ P(X), for the choice procedure it only
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then it must be more costly to provide the more desirable menu M. This assumption
enables us to interpret   as a quality ranking: higher quality menus are more costly to
provide. The concluding section discusses the extent to which our results are robust to
a weakening of this assumption. Assumption A2 means that for any set of content items
in the menu of the consumer’s default ﬁrm, there is an item that the competing ﬁrm can
include in its menu that will attract consumer attention. Put differently, a ﬁrm cannot
prevent consumer attention from being drawn to its rival. The interpretation of A3 is
that costs are not too high, in the sense that when ﬁrms share the market equally, each
has an incentive to do whatever it takes to win the entire market. Thus, A2 implies that
it is feasible for a ﬁrm to attract the attention of its rival’s consumers, while A3 implies
that it will have an incentive to do so if this leads to a 50% increase in its market share.
To simplify the exposition, we introduce the following two pieces of notation. First,
denote M∗ = L(X). By monotonicity of  , M∗ is the smallest menu among those that
consumers ﬁnd most desirable. Henceforth, we refer to M∗ as the best menu for con-





This is the probability that σ assigns to menus that consumers ﬁnd exactly as good as M
(including, of course, M itself).
The case of a consumer who is rational in the sense of always choosing according
to his true underlying preferences   is captured by an attention function f that satisﬁes
f(x M)= 1 forall (x M) ∈ X ×P(X). Werefertothiscaseastherationalbenchmark.I n
this case, both ﬁrms offer the menu M∗ and earn a payoff of 1
2 −c(M∗) in Nash equilib-
rium. Thisisalsothemax-minpayoffunderA2andA3. Thereasonisthattheworst-case
scenario for a ﬁrm, regardless of its strategy, is that its rival chooses the universal set X,
but the best-reply against X is M∗, because this is the least costly menu that generates a
market share of 1
2 against X.
Consumer rationality is not a necessary condition for the rational-consumer out-
come to emerge in equilibrium, as the following remark observes.
Remark1. Supposethat M∗ beatseverymenu M ∈ P(X)forwhich M∗   M. Thenboth
ﬁrms offer M∗ with probability 1 in Nash equilibrium.
We omit the proof, as it is quite conventional. For the rest of the paper, we assume
that the condition for the rational-consumer outcome fails.
A4. There exists M ∈ P(X)such that M∗   M and yet M∗ does not beat M.
Thisassumption, combinedwithA1,impliesthatwhenoneﬁrmoffers M∗,itsoppo-
nent is able to offer a lower cost, lower quality menu M such that consumers’ attention
will not be drawn from M to M∗. We adopt assumptions A1–A4 throughout the rest of
the paper. They turn out to imply that symmetric Nash equilibria are necessarily mixed.
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Proposition 1. Let σ be a symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy. Then (i) βσ(M∗) ∈
(0 1) and (ii) there exists M ∈ S(σ)such that M∗ ⊂ M.
Proof. (i) Suppose that βσ(M∗) = 0.C o n s i d e ram e n uM ∈ S(σ) such that M    M for
all M  ∈ S(σ).T h e nM beats no menu in S(σ). Therefore, M generates a market share of
at most 1
2.I faﬁ r md e v i a t e sf r o mM to X, the deviation is proﬁtable. By A2, it raises the
ﬁrm’s market share from 1
2 to 1, whereas by A3, it changes its cost by c(X)− c(M) < 1
2.
Now suppose that βσ(M∗) = 1. Since M∗ is the (unique) least costly menu M such that
M ∼ M∗, each ﬁrm must offer M∗ with probability 1. By A1 and A4, there exists a menu
M  such that M  is less costly than M∗ and M∗ does not beat M ; thus it is proﬁtable for
aﬁ r mt od e v i a t et oM . It follows that βσ(M∗) ∈ (0 1).
(ii)Assumethecontrary. By(i), βσ(M∗)>0,henceβσ(M∗) = σ(M∗).L e tM1 denote
the set of menus in S(σ)that M∗ beats and let M0 denote the set of menus M ∈ S(σ)for
which M∗   M yet M∗ does not beat M. Recallthat all menus are weakly worse than M∗,
hence, the set M0 ∪M1 includes all the menus other than M∗.
Suppose M1 is empty. Then M∗ generates a payoff 1
2 − c(M∗).L e t ˜ M ∈ S(σ) be a
 -maximal menu in M0.B yA 1 ,c(L( ˜ M))<c(M∗). Moreover, by the deﬁnition of the
beating relation, no menu in S(σ) beats L( ˜ M). Therefore, if a ﬁrm deviated to L( ˜ M),
it would generate a market share of at least 1
2 while costing less than c(M∗),h e n c et h e
deviation would be proﬁtable. It follows that M1 is nonempty.
Let M∗ denote some  -minimal menu in M1.T h u s ,M∗ does not beat any menu in
M1. Suppose that a ﬁrm deviates from M∗ to M∗. This deviation is unproﬁtable only if






σ(M)−c(M∗)+c(M∗) ≤ 0 
Now suppose that a ﬁrm deviates from M∗ to X. This deviation is unproﬁtable only





σ(M)−c(X)+c(M∗) ≤ 0 
Note that S(σ)={ M∗}∪M0 ∪ M1. Therefore, adding up the two inequalities yields the
inequality
1
2 ≤ c(X)−c(M∗)<c( X)  
in contradiction to A3.  
Thus, when the outcome of symmetric Nash equilibrium departs from the rational-
consumer benchmark (in the sense that suboptimal menus are offered with positive
probability), the probability that utility-maximizing menus are offered is positive, and
pure attention grabbers are offered with positive probability. Since a pure attention
grabber is costly to offer and makes no difference for consumer welfare, the equilib-
rium use of pure attention grabbers is socially wasteful. The rationale for the use of pure
attention grabbers is that they exert a positive externality on other items in the ﬁrm’s138 Eliaz and Spiegler Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
menu—theyattractconsumers’attentiontotheseotheritems, thusincreasingtheﬁrm’s
market share.
Comment: The interpretation of L(M)
Recall that the subset L(M) is deﬁned in terms of the preference relation   over menus:
L(M) is the smallest  -equivalent subset of M. At the same time, we interpreted L(M)
asthesetofitemsthattheconsumerregularlyconsumesfromM. Thisinterpretationjus-
tiﬁes our assumption that the attention-grabbing process does not depend on pure at-
tention grabbers in the default menu: whether consumer attention is drawn away from
M should not depend on items in M that are rarely consumed. Also recall that the pure
attention grabbers in any menu are by deﬁnition irrelevant for the preference ranking.
It follows that in our model, pure attention grabbers in the consumer’s default menu are
entirely irrelevant for his choice.
Our interpretation of L(M) does not rule out the possibility that consumers occa-
sionally watch pure attention grabbers. However, consumers would not demand any
compensation if these items were removed from the menu. For example, a sensational
reality show will constitute a pure attention grabber if a consumer refuses to pay a pre-
mium to have access to this program, even thoughhe might occasionally watch the pro-
gram when it is freely available.
The irrelevance of pure attention grabbers in the consumer’s default menu will play
an important role in our analysis. It implies that when ﬁrm j considers whether to add a
pureattentiongrabbertoitsmenu,itweighstheextramenucostonlyagainstthebeneﬁt
of attracting the attention of consumers who are initially assigned to the rival ﬁrm i.
In particular, ﬁrm j need not worry that adding the attention grabber might affect the
choice of those consumers for whom it is the default provider.
We point out that as far as the next section is concerned, none of our results changes
if we adopt an alternative deﬁnition of the beating relation, in which M  replaces L(M ).
Sections 4 and 5, however, rely on our original deﬁnition of the beating relation.
3. Salience-based attention
In this section we analyze in detail a special case of our model. We say that f is a
salience-based attention function if there is a complete, antisymmetric, and transitive
binary relation R on X,s u c ht h a tf(x M)= 1 if and only if xRyfor all y ∈ M.As a l i e n c e -
based attention function captures the idea that items can be ordered according to their
attention-grabbing powers. For instance, R can represent the sensation value of differ-
ent types of news items. To attract attention, a competing channel should broadcast
news items that are at least as sensational as anything the consumer regularly watches
on his default channel. Note that the attention relation R is reﬂexive, i.e., xRxfor all
x ∈ X. For every menu M,l e tr(M)denote the R-maximal item in M. Denote x∗ = r(X).
By A1, cx∗ <c( M∗).B yA 4 ,x∗ / ∈ M∗.
The following example illustrates that although the attention function is based on a
complete and transitive binary relation, the consumer’s choice between menus is typi-
cally inconsistent with maximization of a utility function over menus, since the beating
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Example 1. Suppose xRyRzand that   satisﬁes {z y} { x y}∼{ y} { x}.T h em e n u
{z y} beats the menu {x y} because L({x y}) ={ y} and yRy.T h em e n u{x y} beats {x}
because xRx. However, the menu {z y} does not beat {x} since y  Rxand z Rx.T h e
revealed “indifference” relation over menus is also intransitive. To see why, note that {x}
does not beat {z y} because {z y} { x}. We have already seen that {z y} does not beat
{x}. Thus, consumer choices reveal that he is indifferent between {z y} and {x}. Simi-
larly, {x} does not beat {y} (because {y} { x})a n d{y} does not beat {x} (because y  Rx).
Thus, consumerchoicesrevealthatheisindifferentbetween {x} and {y}. However, {z y}
beats {y},b e c a u s eyRyand {z y} { y}. ♦
If consumers behaved as if they were maximizing some utility function over menus
(which need not coincide with  ), then by the assumption that c(X) < 1
2, competitive
forces would push ﬁrms to offer the cheapest menu among those that are optimal ac-
cording to this revealed preference relation. The fact that consumers choose between
menus in a way that cannot be rationalized is what makes this model nontrivial to
analyze.
3.1 An example: Cheap sensations
We illustrate the structure of symmetric Nash equilibria in this model with the following
simple example. Assume that cx∗ <c x for all x  = x∗. That is, the item with the highest
sensation value is also the cheapest to produce. By A1 and our no-perfect-substitutes
assumption, this means that {x} { x∗} for every x  = x∗. In other words, the best atten-
tion grabber is also the worst item in terms of consumer preferences. Thus, there is an
extreme tension between the items that maximize consumer welfare and the items that
attract the most attention.
There is a symmetric Nash equilibrium in this case, where the mixed equilibrium
strategy σ is
σ{x∗}=2cx∗ (1)
σ(M∗) = 1−2c(M∗) (2)
σ(M∗ ∪{x∗}) = 2c(M∗)−2cx∗  (3)
Toseewhythisisanequilibrium, letuswritedownthepayoffthateachofthethreepure
strategies generates against σ.T h em e n uM∗ generates a market share of 1
2 because it
does not beat any other menu. The menu {x∗} generates a market share of 1
2 − 1
2σ(M∗ ∪
{x∗}) because it is only beaten by M∗ ∪{x∗}. The latter menu generates a market share of
1
2 + 1
2σ({x∗}) because {x∗} is the only menu that M∗ ∪{ x∗} beats. It is easy to see that all
three menus generate a payoff of 1
2 −c(M∗) against σ.
Suppose there exists some menu M outside the support of σ, which yields a higher
payoff against σ. Among all the menus that are  -equivalent to M∗,t h em e n uM∗ ∪{x∗}
isthecheapestexcept M∗ and,inaddition,itattractsattentionawayfromeverypossible
default menu. Therefore, it must be the case that M∗   M, in which case it follows that140 Eliaz and Spiegler Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
M isnecessarilybeatenbyM∗∪{x∗}. SupposeM beats{x∗}. Sincex∗ isthebestattention
grabber in X,i tm u s tb et h a tx∗ ∈ M. Therefore,
c(M)= c(M \{x∗})+cx∗ > 2cx∗ 










It follows that the expected payoff from M is strictly lower than 1
2 −c(M∗), the expected
payoff from each pure strategy in σ.
If M does not beat x∗, then the highest market share it can generate is 1
2 − 1
2σ(M∗ ∪
{x∗}). But since c(M)>cx∗, this same market share can be achieved with lower cost by
offering {x∗}.H e n c e ,M cannot generate a higher expected payoff against σ compared
with the payoff generated by each menu in σ, a contradiction. It follows that σ is a
symmetricequilibriumstrategy. Infact,itistheonlysymmetricequilibrium,asweshow
later.
Observe that in this equilibrium, the total probability that x∗ is offered is 2c(M∗).
However, as cx∗ goes down, x∗ is offered more frequently as a pure attention grabber
and less frequently as a content item.
3.2 Equilibrium characterization
We now turn to characterize the symmetric Nash equilibria. All the results in this sub-
section are based on the assumption that f is a salience-based attention function.
Proposition 2. Let σ be a symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy. Then
(i) ﬁrms earn the max-min payoff 1
2 −c(M∗)
(ii) if M ∈ S(σ)contains a pure attention grabber, then M ∼ M∗
(iii) βσ(M∗) = 1−2cx∗
(iv) σ(M∗ ∪{x∗})>0.
Theproofreliesontwolemmas. Theﬁrstlemmaestablishesthatequilibriummenus
never contain more than one pure attention grabber. The second lemma shows that
the rational-consumer menu M∗ is offered with positive probability in any symmetric
equilibrium. Moreover, this menu fails to attract attention from any inferior menu that
is offered in equilibrium.
Lemma1. Letσ beasymmetricNashequilibriumstrategy. TheneveryM ∈ S(σ)contains
at most one pure attention grabber.
Proof. Assume that M ∈ S(σ) contains at least two pure attention grabbers x and y,
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its market share, for the following reasons. First, M ∼ M \{ y} by the assumption that y
is a pure attention grabber in M.S e c o n d ,M \{ y} beats exactly the same menus as M,
because r(M \{ y}) = r(M).T h i r d ,M \{ y} is beaten by exactly the same menus as M,
because L(M \{y}) = L(M).  
Lemma 2. Let σ be a symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy. Then M∗ ∈ S(σ) and there
exists no menu M ∈ S(σ)that is beaten by M∗.
Proof. Assume the contrary. Deﬁne Mσ ={ M ∈ S(σ) | M ∼ M∗}.B y Proposition 1,  
M∈Mσ σ(M)= βσ(M∗) ∈ (0 1). Suppose that Mσ includes a menu M  = M∗ that beats
no menu in S(σ). Therefore, M generates a market share of 1
2. By the deﬁnition of M∗,
c(M) > c(M∗). It follows that M yields a payoff strictly below the max-min level 1
2 −
c(M∗), a contradiction. The remaining possibility is that for every M ∈ Mσ,t h e r ee x i s t s
˜ M ∈ S(σ)such that M beats ˜ M. Our task in this proof is to rule out this possibility.
List the menus in Mσ as M1     MK, K ≥ 1,s u c ht h a t
r(MK)Rr(MK−1)R···Rr(M1) 
For every Mk ∈ Mσ,l e t ˜ Mk be one of the  -minimal menus among those that are mem-
bers of S(σ)and beaten by Mk. By deﬁnition, r(M1)Rxfor all x ∈ L( ˜ M1). By transitivity
of R, it follows that for every k = 2     K, r(Mk)Rxfor all x ∈ L( ˜ M1), i.e., ˜ M1 is beaten
by every menu in Mσ.
Assume that ˜ M1 beats some M ∈ S(σ).T h a ti s ,r( ˜ M1)Rxfor every x ∈ L(M).L e tu s
distinguish between two cases. First, suppose that r( ˜ M1) ∈ L( ˜ M1).T h e nr(M1)Rr( ˜ M1)
and, by the transitivity of R, r(M1)Rx for every x ∈ L(M), contradicting the deﬁni-
tion of ˜ M1 as a  -minimal menu in S(σ) that is beaten by M1. Second, suppose that
r( ˜ M1) ∈ ˜ M1 \ L( ˜ M1), i.e., that r( ˜ M1) is a pure attention grabber in ˜ M1.B yLemma 1, ˜ M1
contains no other pure attention grabbers except r( ˜ M1). Note that it must be the case
that r( ˜ M1)Rr(M1) and r(M1) Rr( ˜ M1); otherwise, M1 would beat all the menus that ˜ M1
beats,thuscontradictingthedeﬁnitionof ˜ M1.L e tB denotethesetofmenusin S(σ)that
are beaten by ˜ M1 and not by L( ˜ M1). From the ﬁrms’ decision not to deviate from ˜ M1 to





σ(M)−cr( ˜ M1) ≥ 0 
At the same time, from the ﬁrms’ decision not to deviate from M1 to a menu that





σ(M)−cr( ˜ M1) +cr(M1) ≤ 0 
The two inequalities contradict each other.
We have thus established that ˜ M1 beats no menu in S(σ),a sw e l la si sb e a t e nb y
every menu in Mσ. Suppose that a ﬁrm deviates from ˜ M1 to M∗ ∪{ x∗}. Then the ﬁrm
increases its market share by at least 1
2βσ(M∗)+ 1
2(1 − βσ(M∗)) = 1
2, which by assump-
tion is strictly higher than the change in the cost. Therefore, the deviation is proﬁtable,
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We are now ready to prove the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) This follows immediately from Lemma 2. Since M∗ be-
longsto S(σ)and beatsnomenuin S(σ), itgeneratesamarketshareof 1
2 and, therefore,
yields a payoff of 1
2 −c(M∗).
(ii) Assume that there exists a menu M ∈ S(σ) such that (i) M∗   M and (ii) L(M) ⊂
M.I f r(M) ∈ L(M), then every menu beats M if and only if it beats L(M), and every
menu is beaten by M if and only if it is beaten by L(M). Since c(L(M)) < c(M),i ti s
proﬁtable for a ﬁrm to deviate from M to L(M). It follows that r(M) / ∈ L(M),h e n c e
M = L(M)∪{r(M)}. Now consider the menu M∗ ∪{r(M)}. This menu beats every menu
M   ∈ S(σ)that is beaten by M and not by L(M). In addition, by construction, the menu
M∗∪{r(M)} beats M.B yLemma2, M∗ beatsnomenuin S(σ). Itfollowsthatthebeneﬁt
from adding r(M) to M∗ in terms of added market share is strictly higher than the cost
of this addition. Therefore, the deviation is proﬁtable, a contradiction.
(iii) Assume that βσ(M∗)<1−2cx∗.B yLemma 2, M∗ beats no menu in S(σ).T h e r e -
fore, for a deviation to M∗ ∪{x∗} to be unproﬁtable, it must be that cx∗ ≥ 1
2[1−βσ(M∗)],
a contradiction. Now assume that βσ(M∗)>1−2cx∗. By part (ii) of Proposition 1,t h e r e
exists M ∈ S(σ) such that M ⊃ M∗.L e tM∗ denote the set of menus M  ∈ S(σ) that M
beats. Theset M∗ mustbenonempty; otherwise, M generatesapayoffbelow 1
2 −c(M∗),
a contradiction. By part (i), M generates a payoff of 1
2 −c(M∗) against σ. Therefore,
1








M ∈M∗ σ(M ) ≤ 1−βσ(M∗). Therefore,
c(M)−c(M∗) ≤ 1
2[1−βσ(M∗)] <c x∗ 
Hence,noneofthesemenusM includesx∗.L e tM∗∗ bethe -maximalmenuamong
all menus M for which M∗   M and x∗ ∈ L(M).T h u s ,M∗∗ is not beaten by any menu in
S(σ). Hence, it achieves a market share of at least 1
2.B yA 1 ,c[L(M∗∗)] <c[L(M∗)].B u t
this means that M∗∗ generates a payoff higher than 1
2 − c(M∗), in contradiction to part
(i) of the proposition.
(iv) Assume M∗ ∪{ x∗} does not belong to S(σ). Then a ﬁrm that deviates to M∗∗,a s
deﬁned in the proof of (iii), would earn more than 1
2 −c(M∗), in contradiction to part (i)
of the proposition.  
Thus, symmetric Nash equilibria in this model have several strong properties. First,
although the equilibrium outcome departs from the rational-consumer benchmark,
ﬁrms’ proﬁts are equal to the max-min level, which, as we saw, coincides with the
rational-consumer benchmark. In other words, industry proﬁts are in some sense com-
petitive. The use of pure attention grabbers is restricted to menus that consumers ﬁnd
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pure attention grabber to attract attention to M∗. In contrast, when ﬁrms offer subopti-
mal menus, they do not adorn them with pure attention grabbers. Finally, the probabil-
ity that suboptimal menus are offered is entirely determined by the cost of the best at-
tention grabber. As this cost goes up, the probability that consumers are offered menus
that maximize their utility goes down.
On a somewhat speculative note, this result provides a perspective into the ongoing
debate over the sensationalism of broadcast television, particularly news (see Bennett
2007). Criticsinthisdebateattackpopularchannelsforengaginginemptyrating-driven
sensationalism. Broadcasters typically retort that they “give the public what it wants.”
Viewed through the prism of Proposition 2, both parties to this debate are right to some
extent. Indeed, media providers use sensationalism as a pure attention-grabbing device
that does not directly increase consumer welfare. However, as the cost of the sensa-
tional items declines, it is more likely that these items help give viewers what they want,
because they help to draw their attention to a package that maximizes their utility.
Recall that in our discussion of the example in the previous subsection, we claimed
that there exist no symmetric equilibria apart from the one given there. We can now
apply Lemma 1 and Proposition 2 to prove this claim.
Proposition 3. If cx∗ <c x for all x  = x∗,t h e n( 1)–(3) is the unique symmetric equilib-
rium strategy.
Proof.L e t σ be some symmetric equilibrium. By Proposition 2,ﬁ r m se a r nt h em a x -
min payoff, and both M∗ and M∗ ∪{ x∗} are in S(σ). Suppose S(σ) also contains some
M/ ∈{ M∗ {x∗} (M∗ ∪{ x∗})}.I f M ∈ S(σ) contains a pure attention grabber, then by
part (ii) of Proposition 2, M ∼ M∗.B yLemma 1, M = M∗ ∪{ y} for some y ∈ X.I fy  = x∗,
then M∗∪{x∗} achievesatleastas highamarketshareas M butwithlowercosts. Hence,
M does not contain a pure attention grabber.
Denote by A the set of menus M ∈ S(σ) \{ M∗ {x∗}} for which L(M) = M.L e t˜ M
be the  -minimal menu in A. Suppose x∗ / ∈ ˜ M.T h e n˜ M does not beat any menu in
S(σ).L e tB ⊂ A denote the subset of menus in A that beat {x∗}.I fB is nonempty, then
every menu in this set must include x∗. By the deﬁnition of ˜ M, every menu in B must
also beat ˜ M. It follows that both ˜ M and {x∗} achieve exactly the same market share, but
{x∗} is cheaper. Suppose x∗ ∈ ˜ M.T h e n ˜ M necessarily beats x∗, but every menu in S(σ)
that beats {x∗} also beats ˜ M. Hence, the gain in market share from playing ˜ M instead
of {x∗} is 1
2σ({x∗}). Since ˜ M ∈ S(σ),i tm u s tb et h a tc( ˜ M \{ x∗}) ≤ 1
2σ({x∗}). Since by
assumption, x∗ is the cheapest item, it must be true that cx∗ < 1
2σ({x∗}). But by part (iii)
ofProposition2,cx∗ = 1
2[1−βσ(M∗)].SinceweassumethatS(σ)includes ˜ M,inaddition
toM∗, M∗∪{x∗},and{x∗},weconcludethat1−βσ(M∗)>σ( {x∗}),hencecx∗ > 1
2σ({x∗}),
a contradiction. It follows that ˜ M/ ∈ S(σ), which implies that S(σ) can only include M∗,
M∗∪{x∗} or {x∗}. Itisstraightforwardtoshowthat S(σ)mustincludeallofthesemenus.
Therefore, the unique symmetric equilibrium is given by (1)–(3).  
Thus, when the tension between the things that maximize consumers’ utility and
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extremely simple: each ﬁrm offers the attention grabber only, the best menu only, or the
two combined. When x∗ is not the cheapest alternative, one can construct equilibria
with a more complicated structure.
4. Similarity-based attention
In the previous section, we assumed that items can be ordered according to how well
theyattractattention, independentlyofwhattheyattractattentionfrom. Inmanycases,
however, an item attracts attention if it is similar to what the consumer regularly con-
sumes. For instance, think of a TV viewer on a channel-ﬂipping cruise. If he stumbles
upon a familiar show, he may pause and pay more attention to the channel on which
the show is aired.
Likewise, when a channel programs shows that contain features that are familiar
to viewers from their TV habits, viewers are more likely to recall the channel and thus
consider it as an option when thinking about what to watch on TV. Several studies in
psychology and marketing conﬁrm this intuition. For example, subjects in Markman
and Gentner (1997) were asked to make similarity comparisons between pairs of pic-
tures and were then probed for recall. The recall probes were ﬁgures taken from the
pictures and were either alignable (related to the commonalities) or nonalignable dif-
ferences between the pairs. The authors show that the alignable differences were better
memoryprobesthanthenonalignabledifferences. Followingupontheseresults, Zhang
and Markman (1998) show that attributes that differentiate later entrants from the ﬁrst
entrant are better remembered and are listed more often in judgment formation proto-
cols if the attributes are comparable along some common aspect (i.e., they are alignable
differences) than if they do not correspond to any attributes of the ﬁrst entrant (i.e., they
are nonalignable differences).
Our model can capture this idea, provided that we interpret the attention function
f as an object that captures the role of recall in the attention-generation process. We
envisiontheconsumerastryingtorecallfrommemorythosemenusthatareavailableto
himbeforemakinghismediaconsumptiondecision. Thedefaultmenuiseasilyrecalled
since the consumer is used to it. However, a new menu may or may not be recalled, and
the consumer will ﬁnd it easier to recall it if it contains items that are similar to what he
is already familiar with.
For simplicity, we assume in this section that consumers have max-max preferences
over menus. Formally, we assume that there is a linear order  ∗ on X such that M   M 
if and only if there exists x ∈ M such that x  ∗ y for all y ∈ M . The interpretation is that
every menu contains a single item that the consumer regularly consumes. By A1, x  ∗ y
if and only if cx >c y. For every menu M,l e tb(M) denote the  ∗-maximal item in M.
Thus, for every menu M, L(M) ={ b(M)}. Denote y∗ = b(X). Given a mixed strategy
σ,d e ﬁ n eβσ(x) =
 
b(M)=xσ(M)to be the probability that x is offered as a  ∗-maximal
item in a menu.
To incorporate similarity considerations, we impose some structure on the set of
items. Assume that X ⊂ R. For every x ∈ X,l e tI(x)be a neighborhood of x.8 Assume
8This deﬁnition captures similarity as proximity. This is different from the notion of alignability invoked
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that the attention function f satisﬁes the following: for every x y ∈ X, f(x {y}) = 1 if
y ∈ I(x). Our assumptions on   and f imply the following deﬁnition of the beating rela-
tion. For every M M  ∈ P(X), M beats M  if the following two conditions hold: (i) there
exists x ∈ M such that b(M ) ∈ I(x); (ii) b(M)  ∗ b(M ).
Note that the attention function induces a reﬂexive binary relation R on X,d e ﬁ n e d
as xRy if y ∈ I(x). This is the similarity relation that underlies the attention func-
tion. Theinterpretationisthatconsiderationsetsareconstructedaccordingtosimilarity
judgments. Foreachproduct y, thereisasetofproductsthatresembleit. Theconsumer
is willing to consider substitutes to his default if the competing ﬁrm offers some item it
resembles. Note that by A4, there exists x ∈ X such that x/ ∈ I(y∗). Since M∗ ={ y∗},t h e
max-min payoff is 1
2 −cy∗.9
We now investigate symmetric Nash equilibria under this class of attention func-
tions. We begin with an important lemma that relates the probability that an inferior
item is offered as a content item (i.e., as the  ∗-maximal item on a menu) to its cost.
Lemma 3. Let σ be a symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy. Then βσ(x) ≤ 2cx for all
x  = y∗.
Proof. Assume the contrary. Let x be the  ∗-minimal product for which 1
2βσ(x) > cx.
Suppose that there exists a menu M ∈ S(σ) such that b(M)  ∗ x and y  Rxfor all y ∈ M.
Then M doesnotbeatanymenu M  with b(M ) = x.I faﬁ r md e v i a t e sf r o mM to M ∪{x},
then since b(M)  ∗ x, the probability that some menu M   with b(M  )  ∗ b(M) beats M
does not change. Therefore, by reﬂexivity of R, the deviation increases the ﬁrm’s payoff
by at least 1
2βσ(x) − cx > 0, hence it is proﬁtable. It follows that for every M ∈ S(σ) for
which b(M)  ∗ x,t h e r ee x i s t ss o m ey ∈ M such that yRx,s ot h a tM beats any M  with
b(M ) = x.
Now consider a menu M ∈ S(σ) with b(M) = x (there must be such a menu, since
by assumption, 1
2βσ(x) > cx > 0) and suppose that a ﬁrm deviates to M ∪{ y∗}.T h e




The reason is that, ﬁrst, M ∪{ y∗} beats any menu M  with b(M ) = x,a n d ,s e c o n d ,
whereas prior to the deviation every menu M  ∈ S(σ) with b(M )  ∗ x had beaten M
(as we showed in the previous paragraph), after the deviation no menu beats M ∪{ y∗}.
For this deviation to be unproﬁtable, we must have 1
2
 
y ∗xβ(y) ≤ cy∗. By the def-
inition of x, 1




y∈X β(y) ≤ cy∗ +
 
y|x ∗y cy <c ( X) . Since the left-hand side of this inequality is by
deﬁnition 1
2,w eo b t a i n1
2 −c(X)≤ 0, contradicting condition A3.  
Lemma 3 implies that βσ(y∗) ≥ 1 − 2
 
x =y∗ cx. That is, the probability that ﬁrms
offer the best item has a lower bound that decreases with the cost of inferior products.
This result relies only on the reﬂexivity of R and thus does not rest on the additional
topological structure we impose.
9TherelationRisnotnecessarilysymmetric. Thatis,itispossiblethatx ∈ I(y)andy/ ∈ I(x). Forevidence
that similarity judgments are not always symmetric, see Tversky (1977). In addition, our assumptions do
notruleoutthepossibilitythatRiscomplete,transitive,andantisymmetric. Therefore,thecaseofsalience-
based consideration and max-max preferences is subsumed as a special case of the following analysis.146 Eliaz and Spiegler Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
Lemma 4. Let σ be a symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy. For every M ∈ S(σ) with
b(M)  = y∗ there exists M  ∈ S(σ)with b(M ) = y∗ such that M  does not beat M.
Proof. Assume the contrary and let M ∈ S(σ) be a menu which is beaten by all
M  ∈ S(σ) with b(M ) = y∗.I faﬁ r md e v i a t e sf r o mM to M ∪{ y∗}, it increases its mar-
ket share by more than 1
2βσ(y∗). For this deviation to be unproﬁtable, we must have
βσ(y∗) ≤ 2cy∗. Combined with Lemma 3,w eo b t a i n
 
xβσ(x) ≤ 2c(X). Since the left-
hand side is equal to 1, we obtain a contradiction.  
Using this lemma, we can now show that in equilibrium, ﬁrms cannot sustain a pay-
off above the rational-consumer benchmark level.
Proposition 4. Firms earn the max-min payoff 1
2 −cy∗ in any symmetric Nash equilib-
rium.
Proof. We begin the proof with some preliminaries. Deﬁne M ={ M ⊆ X \{ y∗}|
M ∪{y∗}∈S(σ)}. Denote Bσ(M) ={ z ∈ X \{y∗}|βσ(z) > 0 and z ∈ I(x)forsome x ∈ M}.
Let
 (M) = 1
2




be the net payoff gain from adding the subset M to {y∗}, given that the rival ﬁrm plays
σ. Note that in the menu M ∪{ y∗},t h ei t e m si nM are all pure attention grabbers. The
function   is subadditive: for every M, M ,  (M ∪ M ) ≤  (M) +  (M ). For every M
and M  such that M  ⊂ M, denote δ(M  M)=  (M)− (M \M ).T h u s ,δ(M  M)is the
marginalcontributionof M  totheproﬁtgeneratedby M (whenthesesetsarecombined
with y∗). Finally, for every x ∈ X,l e ty∗(x) and y∗(x) be the largest and smallest elements
in X that belong to I(x).
Assume that ﬁrms earn a payoff strictly above 1
2 − cy∗ under σ.B y Lemma 4,
βσ(x) = 0 for all x satisfying y∗Rxand x  = y∗. This means that the menu {y∗} generates
apay off1
2 −cy∗ against σ,henceitdoesnotbelongto S(σ).B yProposition1, βσ(y∗)>0.
Therefore,foramenu M ∪{y∗}∈S(σ), M ∈ M,togenerateapayoffabove 1
2 −cy∗,itmust
b et h ec a s et h a t (M) > 0. We will show that this leads to a contradiction with Lemma 4.
Since by Proposition 1, βσ(y∗)<1, M must contain at least two menus; otherwise,
Lemma 4 is trivially violated. For every M ∈ M,l e tm ∈ M be the item with the maximal
y∗(x) among the elements x ∈ M with  ({m})>0.B e c a u s e  is sub-additive,  (M) > 0
implies that there exists x  ∈ M such that  ({x })>0.I fx  is the item with the highest
y∗(x) among all x ∈ M,t h e nx  = m.O t h e r w i s e ,every x ∈ M with y∗(x) > y∗(m) satisﬁes
 (x) = 0. Order the elements of each M ∈ M such that M ={ xM
1      xM
n(M)     xM
|M|},
where xM
n(M) = m. By subadditivity,  [{xM
n(M)+1     xM
|M|}] = 0.
Order the menus M ∈ M according to y∗(m),s u c ht h a tM ={ M1     MK}, y∗(m1) ≥
···≥y∗(mK). We already saw that K ≥ 2. Suppose that y∗(mj)>y ∗(mK) for some
j = 1     K−1.T h e n MK cannot be a best reply to σ. The reason is that a ﬁrm can
deviate to the menu {x
MK
1      mK mj}, and this deviation will be proﬁtable. The rea-
son for this is that the removal of {x
MK
n(MK)+1     x
MK
|MK|} from MK does not affect proﬁts,Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Strategic use of attention grabbers 147
whereas, by construction,  (mj)>0,a n dBσ{mj} and Bσ({x
MK
1      mK}) are mutually
disjoint; therefore, adding mj strictly raises proﬁts. It follows that y∗(mj) ≤ y∗(mK) for
every j = 1     K−1. By construction, y∗(mK) ≤ y∗(mj) for every j = 1     K. Since
I(mj) is a real interval for every j = 1     K, it follows that y∗(mK) ∈ Bσ(M) for every
M ∈ M, contradicting Lemma 4. To see why we obtain a contradiction, note that for
MK ∪{y∗} to be played in an equilibrium σ, there must be some menu ˆ M in S(σ),w h i c h
is beaten by MK ∪{ y∗}.B u t t h e nˆ M will be beaten by any menu that contains y∗,i n
contradiction to Lemma 4.  
Identity-based attention
An extreme case of similarity-based attention is when I(x)={ x} for all x ∈ X,s u c ht h a t





to be the probability that an item x is offered as a pure attention grabber under σ.
Proposition 5. Suppose that I(x)={ x} for all x ∈ X. Then, in any symmetric Nash
equilibrium σ, βσ(x) = 2cx and ασ(x) = 2(cy∗ −cx) for all x  = y∗.
Proof.B y Proposition 4,ﬁ r m se a r nap a y o f fo f1
2 −cy∗ in symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Observe that under the identity attention relation, M beats M  if and only if b(M)  ∗
b(M ) and b(M ) ∈ M. Supposethat ασ(x) = 0 forsome x  = y∗.Thenifaﬁrmplays{x},i t
earns 1
2 − cx > 1
2 − cy∗, a contradiction. Therefore, ασ(x) > 0 for all x  = y∗.L e tM ∈ S(σ)
be a menu that includes some x  = y∗ as a pure attention grabber. By Lemma 3, βσ(x) ≤
2cx. If the inequality is strict, it is proﬁtable for a ﬁrm to deviate from M to M \{ x}.I t
follows that βσ(x) = 2cx. But this means that any menu M ∈ S(σ)with b(M) = x, x  = y∗,
yields the same payoff against σ as the singleton {x}. Therefore, 1
2[1 − ασ(x)]−cx =
1
2 −cy∗, i.e., ασ(x) = 2cy∗ −2cx.  
Thus, as an inferior product becomes more costly, it is offered more often as a con-
tent item and less often as a pure attention grabber. The total probability that any infe-
rior product is offered is 2cy∗.10
5. The effective marketing property
One of the features of symmetric equilibria under salience-based attention functions is
that pure attention grabbers were offered only in conjunction with the menu M∗,w h i c h
is optimal from the consumers’ point of view. This property does not hold for general
10To see a simple example of this equilibrium characterization, let X ={ y∗ x∗}, y∗  ∗ x∗.T h e n{y∗} is
the minimal best menu, {x∗} is the cheapest but worst menu, and {x∗ y∗} attracts attention from any other
menu. To compute the equilibrium in this example, note that it is equivalent to the “cheap sensations”
example of salience-based consideration, where M∗ ={ y∗} and x∗ is the best attention grabber.148 Eliaz and Spiegler Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
attention functions. For example, under identity-based attention (see the previous sec-
tion), it is easy to construct equilibria in which menus offered with positive probability
that are inferior to M∗ contain pure attention grabbers.
In this section, we will see that equilibria in which ﬁrms earn rational-consumer
proﬁts satisfy a weaker property that links the inclusion of pure attention grabbers in a
menu to its quality. This property extends and adapts a similar result (which goes by the
same name) derived in Eliaz and Spiegler (forthcoming) in a different market environ-
ment (see our discussion in the Introduction). Its proof does not rely on assumptions
A1–A4.
Consider an arbitrary tuple (  f c),s u c ht h a t  satisﬁes monotonicity and no per-
fect substitutes. Suppose that a consumer is initially assigned to a ﬁrm that offers a
menu M , which is strictly worse than M∗. Suppose also that the consumer’s attention is
drawn to the competing ﬁrm’s menu M only because of a pure attention grabber in M.
We show that if M and M  are drawn from an equilibrium strategy that induces rational-
consumer proﬁts, it mustbethecasethat M   M , hencetheconsumer will switch away
from M  to M. A priori, the fact that a pure attention grabber attracts the consumer to
consider a menu does not guarantee that he will choose that menu over his default op-
tion. Theconnectionbetweenthetwoemergesinequilibrium,asaresultofcompetitive
forces.
Proposition 6 (Effective marketing property). Suppose that a symmetric Nash equilib-
rium strategy σ induces the max-min payoff 1
2 − c(M∗).L e tM and M  be two menus in
S(σ) that satisfy the properties (i) M∗   M , (ii) f(x L(M )) = 1 for some x ∈ M \ L(M),
and (iii) f(x L(M )) = 0 for all x ∈ L(M).T h e nM   M .
Proof. Assumethecontrary, i.e., thereexistmenus M M  ∈ S(σ)thatsatisfyproperties
(i)–(iii) above and yet M   M .L e tB denote the set of menus in S(σ) that are beaten by
M and not by L(M). Note that M  / ∈ B. From the ﬁrm’s decision not to deviate from M to





σ( ˜ M)−c(M \L(M)) ≥ 0 
The reason is that when a ﬁrm adds a pure attention grabber to a menu it offers, it can
change only the set of menus that the ﬁrm’s menu beats, but not the set of menus that
the ﬁrm’s menu is beaten by.
Now suppose that a ﬁrm deviates to the menu M∗ ∪ (M \ L(M)). By assumption,
ﬁrms earn rational-consumer proﬁts in equilibrium. Therefore, M∗ does not beat any





σ( ˜ M)+ 1
2σ(M )−c(M \L(M)) ≤ 0 
The reason is that adding M \ L(M) to M∗ allows a ﬁrm to beat not only all the menus
in B,b u ta l s ot h em e n uM . However, the two inequalities we derived contradict each
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As we saw in Sections 3 and 4, Proposition 6 is not vacuous, because there exist large
classes of attention functions for which all symmetric Nash equilibria induce rational-
consumer proﬁts. In Section 7 we comment on the generality of rational-consumer
equilibrium proﬁts.
Weconcludethissectionwithademonstrationthattheeffectivemarketingproperty
can be useful in characterizing the rate at which consumers switch ﬁrms in equilibrium.
Recall the case of identity-based attention analyzed in the previous section. Given the
equilibrium characterization of βσ(·) and ασ(·) in Proposition 5, we can calculate the
fraction of consumers who switch a supplier given a symmetric equilibrium strategy
σ. We denote this fraction by λ(σ). By the effective marketing property, a consumer
switches from one ﬁrm to the other if and only if the highest quality item in the former’s








Our assumptions on menu costs ensure that λ(σ) ∈ (0 1). Thus, consumers switch sup-
pliers in equilibrium. By comparison, no switching occurs in the rational-consumer
benchmark. Note that λ(σ) behaves nonmonotonically in menu costs and approaches
an upper bound of (n − 1) · c2
y∗ as the costs of all items x  = y∗ cluster near cy∗/2.T h e
reason for this nonmonotonicity is that as an inferior item becomes more costly to add,
it is offered less frequently as a pure attention grabber and more frequently as a content
item.
Observe that the switching rate is exactly equal to the equilibrium expected cost of
pure attention grabbers: for each x  = y∗, the probability x is offered as a pure attention
grabber by each ﬁrm is by deﬁnition ασ(x), while by Proposition 5, βσ(x) is equal to
twice the cost of x. Thus, the general relation between the social cost of pure attention
grabbersandtheirroleinattractingconsumers’attentionisespeciallytransparentinthe
case of identity-based attention: the “deadweight loss” associated with pure attention
grabbers is equal to consumers’ switching rate.
6. Heterogeneous consumer preferences
In our analysis thus far we have maintained the simplifying assumption that consumers
have identical tastes. This section explores the implications of relaxing this assumption
in the context of salience-based attention. In particular, we wish to provide a partial
“representative agent” justiﬁcation for the model analyzed in Section 3. In the original
model, weassumedconsumerhomogeneitybutdid notforce L(M) tobeasingleton for
all M. In contrast, in the present section we allow for taste heterogeneity but force L(M)
to be a singleton for all M (as we did in Section 4). Thus, we may interpret consumer
choices in Section 3 as the behavior of a “representative agent” relative to a consumer
population with a particular distribution of preferences.
Partition the grand set X into two subsets, A ={ a1     am} and B ={ b1     bn}.
There are m consumer types, where type i is fully characterized by a preference re-
lation  ∗
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each type in the consumer population is 1/m. With respect to menu costs, assume
cx = c ≤ 1/(2(m + 1)) for all x ∈ X. The upper bound on costs plays the same role as
the 50% bound we imposed in Section 2, namely it provides a clear rational-consumer
benchmark and ensures a certain minimal level of competitiveness.
We begin by characterizing the rational-consumer benchmark for this environment.
We omit the proof for brevity.
Remark 2. Suppose all consumer types are endowed with the perfect-attention atten-
tion function f(x M)= 1 for all x ∈ X, M ∈ P(X). Then there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium in which both ﬁrms offer A.
In contrast, assume now that all consumer types share a salience-based attention
function as in Section 3. That is, let R be a complete, transitive, and antisymmetric bi-
nary relationon X. For allconsumers, the attention function is f(x M)= 1 if and only if
xRyfor all y ∈ M. Thus, while we assume preference heterogeneity among consumers,
we retain the assumption that they are all identical as far as the attention-grabbing
process is concerned. For any S ⊆ X,l e tr(S) denote the R-maximal element in S.L e t
a∗ ≡ r(A)and b∗ ≡ r(B). Assume r(X)= b∗. That is, the item with the highest sensation
value is not a most preferred item for any consumer type.
It turns out that in this case, there exists a symmetric equilibrium that has similar
features to the symmetric equilibrium when all consumers have identical tastes and
the least preferred item is also the best attention grabber. In this equilibrium, ﬁrms’
expected payoff is the same as in the rational-consumer benchmark, and the effective
marketing property continues to hold for all consumer types.
Proposition 7. Under the above speciﬁcation of R, the following is a symmetric Nash
equilibrium:
σ({b∗}) = 2c (4)
σ(A∪{b∗}) = 2(m−1)c (5)
σ(A)= 1−2mc  (6)
Proof. First, note thatby our assumption on thesize of costs, the expressions in (4)–(6)
are probabilities. Second, note that each of the menus in the support generates an ex-
pected payoff of 1
2 − mc. Suppose a ﬁrm, say ﬁrm 1, deviates to playing A  ∪ B ,w h e r e
A  ⊆ A and B  ⊆ B.I fA  ∪B  does no better than A∪{b∗} against the proposed equilib-
rium σ, then it cannot do better than any of the other pure strategies in σ, and so it is
not a proﬁtable deviation.
Notice that A  ∪ B  is potentially a proﬁtable deviation only if it contains fewer ele-
ments than A∪{b∗} does. Let k bethedifferencebetweenthecardinalityof A∪{b∗} and
the cardinality of A  ∪ B .T h e nk ≤ m.L e tk  ≡| A − A |.T h e nk ≤ k .W ec o n s i d e rt w o
cases.
Assume b∗ / ∈ B .T h e n A  ∪ B  does not steal consumers from a ﬁrm offering {b∗},
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switch from A  ∪B  to A∪{b∗}. The best scenario that can happen when a ﬁrm deviates
to A ∪B  is thatno consumer leaves theﬁrm when the other ﬁrm offers A. Suppose this
is true. This gives us an upper bound on theexpected marketshare A ∪B  can generate.
So the expected gain from this deviation is at most k c, which is the savings in costs. The
expected loss is 1
2 · 2c, the probability that the consumer starts with the other ﬁrm and
the other ﬁrm offers b∗,p l u s1
2 · (k /m)· 2(m − 1)c, the probability that the consumer
starts with the deviant ﬁrm, the consumer’s favorite item is in A−A , and the other ﬁrm
offers A∪{b∗}. Thus, the total expected loss is k c+(1−k /m)c, while the expected gain
is only k c. So on net, the deviation leads to an expected loss of at least (1−k /m)c>0.
Assume next that b∗ ∈ B .T h e nA  ∪ B  steals consumers from the other ﬁrm when
that ﬁrm offers {b∗}: it steals all consumers whose top item is in A  and may steal other
consumers who rank at least one element in A  ∪ B  above b∗.S oa tm o s t ,A  ∪ B  steals
all consumers who start with b∗. But because B  does contain b∗, the deviation saves at
most (k  − 1)c. The expected loss is now at least k c − (k /m)c. So on net, the deviation
leads to an expected loss of (1−k /m)c>0.  
7. Concluding remarks
This paper analyzed a stylized model of market competition that emphasized con-
sumers’ limited attention and the role of the ﬁrms’ product line decisions in manipu-
lating consumers’ attention. Equilibrium behavior departs from the benchmark of ra-
tional consumers with unlimited attention. Firms offer menus that are inferior to the
consumers’ ﬁrst best and employ costly pure attention grabbers in equilibrium. For two
natural special cases of our model, industry proﬁts are exactly the same as if consumers
hadunlimitedattention: thecostlyuseofpureattentiongrabberswearsoffanycollusive
payoff ﬁrms might earn as a result of consumers’ bounded rationality. This result has an
important corollary regarding consumer conversion: whenever consumers’ attention is
drawn to a menu thanks to a pure attention grabber it contains, they end up switching
to this menu.
How general are rational-consumer equilibrium proﬁts?
The following is an example of an attention function that satisﬁes assumptions A1–
A4, and yet gives rise to equilibria that sustain proﬁts above the rational-consumer
level (this is a variant on an example given in Eliaz and Spiegler forthcoming). Let





k=1yk,t h e nx  ∗ y. Assume that the consumers’ preferences
over menus are M   M  if and only if there exists x ∈ M such that x  ∗ y for all y ∈ M .
Therefore, M∗ ={ (1 1 1)}. Assume further that f(x {y}) = 1 if and only if xk = yk for
at least two components k ∈{ 1 2 3}. This is a similarity-based attention function in
t h es a m es p i r i to fSection 4, except that the topology over X that deﬁnes the similarity
relation is different.
One can show that for an appropriately speciﬁed cost function, there is a con-
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equilibrium strategy consists of {(1 1 1) (1 1 0)}, {(1 1 1) (1 0 1)}, {(1 1 1) (0 0 1)},
{(1 0 0)}, {(0 1 0)},a n d{(0 0 1)}; (ii) the equilibrium payoff is strictly above the
rational-consumer (max-min) level of 1
2 −c(1 1 1). There is also a symmetric equilibrium
that induces rational-consumer payoffs.
How typical is this counterexample? We conjecture that for generic cost functions,
any attention function that satisﬁes A1–A3 induces rational-consumer payoffs in sym-
metric equilibrium. When A3 is signiﬁcantly strengthened, i.e., when menu costs are
sufﬁciently small, the result holds with no need for a genericity requirement. The proof
of this result is simple and close to a parallel result in Eliaz and Spiegler (forthcoming),
and, therefore, is omitted.
The relation between costs and preferences
Our primary motivation for assuming that consumer preferences over menus are posi-
tively related to the cost of providing them is to introduce an anticompetitive force due
to consumer inattention. To depart from the unlimited-attention benchmark, a ﬁrm
should have an incentive to exploit a consumer who fails to consider its rival. Assump-
tion A1 implies this incentive. However, we should point out that this motive to degrade
quality can be achieved with a weaker assumption than A1, namely, that there exists
some menu that is not beaten by M∗ and costs strictly less than M∗. In fact, many of our
results would continue to hold under this weaker assumption (speciﬁcally, part (i) of
Proposition 1, parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 2, Lemmas 3 and 4, Propositions 4 and 6).
Also our analysis in Section 6 does not depend on A1, as it is not well deﬁned with het-
erogeneous preferences.
A comment on welfare analysis
Recallthatconsumerchoiceinourmodelis,ingeneral,inconsistentwiththemaximiza-
tion of a utility function over menus. Therefore, welfare analysis in our model cannot be
given a conventional revealed preference justiﬁcation. Throughout this paper, we inter-
preted   as the consumers’ true preferences over menus, and used it to analyze con-
sumer welfare. However, there are alternative interpretations of our choice model that
might suggest different welfare criteria.
Recall the case of salience-based attention studied in Section 3. Assume that con-
sumers have max-max preferences over menus (i.e., there is a linear ordering  ∗ over X
such that M   M  if and only if there exists x ∈ M for which x  ∗ y for all y ∈ M ). This
speciﬁcation admits an alternative interpretation in the spirit of the literature on dy-
namically inconsistent preferences, whereby the rationale that consumers use to rank
menus differs from the rationale they use when ranking items within a given menu.
According to this interpretation, the binary relation R represents the preferences over
items of the consumer’s “ﬁrst-period self,” whereas  ∗ represents the preference over
items of his “second-period self.” The consumer is naive in the sense of O’Donoghue
andRabin(1999): whenhechoosesbetweenmenus, heerroneouslybelievesthathewill
use his ﬁrst-period self’s preference relation R to choose an item from menus, whereas
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When economists study such two-stage, multi-self choice models with naive deci-
sion makers, they often use the ﬁrst-period self’s preference relation as the normative
welfare criterion, because it tends to represent cool deliberation, whereas the second-
period self’s preference relation captures visceral urges that are inconsistent with long-
run well-being. It follows that if we adopted this alternative interpretation of the model,
we would be led to conduct a welfare analysis that replaces   with R as a welfare cri-
terion. Note, however, that this ambiguity arises in a very special speciﬁcation of our
model. At any rate, this discussion demonstrates the subtlety of welfare analysis in mar-
ket models with boundedly rational consumers.
The monotonicity assumption
To develop the temptation theme further, note that some of the leading examples for
salient items were also examples of tempting alternatives. A media item containing
violence or pornography is not only a good attention grabber, but also a temptation.
Likewise, a fancy cake on display is more likely to draw attention than a healthy salad,
and typically it is also a bigger temptation. If we actually wanted to accommodate
temptation-driven preferences over menus in the spirit of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001),
wewouldhavetoreplaceourmonotonicityassumptionwithapropertythatallowscon-
sumers to prefer smaller menus, such as set-betweenness.
However, such a change would force us to modify our deﬁnition of pure attention
grabbers. To see why, suppose the consumer is indifferent between the singleton menu
{banana} and the larger menu {apple, banana, hamburger}. This indifference can be ex-
plained as follows: apple is ranked over banana, banana is ranked over hamburger, but
a hamburger tempts the consumer, such that including it in the menu creates a disu-
tility that offsets the additional utility from an apple. Hence, the apple and hamburger
do affect the consumer’s utility from the menu and should not be interpreted as pure
attention grabbers. To appropriately identify pure attention grabbers in the presence of
temptation-driven preferences, we can modify their deﬁnition as follows: the elements
in M \ M  are pure attention grabbers if M ∼ M  and M   T for any subset T of M \ M .
Note that under monotonicity, this deﬁnition is equivalent to our original deﬁnition.
Analyzing strategic use of attention grabbers in the presence of temptation-driven pref-
erences is left for future research.11
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